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Twenty-five train operating companies (TOCs) were created between 1994-1997, as part of the 
restructuring process of the railway industry in Great Britain. The TOCs operate monopoly franchises for 
the provision of passenger rail services over certain routes - some of which continue to receive 
government subsidies. This paper investigates how the efficiency of these train operating companies 
evolved prior to the October 2000 Hatfield crash (which caused significant disruption to the network) 
using data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis. Our data allows us to look at the relative 
efficiency and productivity through the privatisation, to control the efficiency scores for environmental 
data and to correlate these results with safety and quality indicators. The analysis sheds some light on the 
successes and failures of the UK’s most controversial privatisation to date. 
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This paper examines past performance of Great Britain’s rail service provision, with special focus 
on efficiency and productivity changes exhibited at the point of the implementation of privatisation 
in mid-90s. This investigation is based on a unique data set that was created for the purpose of this 
study. The data derive from many different sources including company accounts, regulatory reports, 
specialised industry publications and information provided directly by the companies. To the best of 
our knowledge this is the first attempt to tackle the direct effects of UK’s most controversial 
privatisation on the efficiency of rail service provision. 
 
The widely held belief that government owned utilities tend to operate inefficiently, and constitute a 
burden on the public purse drove the last and most controversial privatisation in Britain: the 
Railways. This privatisation took place between 1994 and 1997. British Rail (BR), the state owned, 
vertically integrated national monopoly was radically restructured and separated into more than 100 
successor companies which were privatised. As part of this process 25 train operating companies 
(TOCs) were created which leased rolling stock from the rolling stock companies (ROSCOs) and 
operated monopoly franchises for the provision of passenger rail services over certain routes. Two 
new regulatory bodies, the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) and the Office of Passenger Rail 
Franchising (OPRAF) were established. The ORR regulates the single track operator, Network Rail 
(formerly Railtrack), while OPRAF (now the Strategic Rail Authority – SRA) regulates the TOCs. 
 
Under the privatisation many franchisees continued to receive government subsidies for the 
provision of services. Although the subsidy bill was supposed to be declining over time - after an   4
immediate post-privatisation surge - some problems became evident that have caused more, rather 
than less money necessary to be allocated to this industry by the government (see DETR, 2001).  In 
October 2000 a major train crash (at Hatfield) led to a prolonged period of disruption on the rail 
network and much criticism of the original privatisation process. Such an event and the further 
partial reintegration that subsequently occurred in the industry, lead us to decide defining the period 
1994/5-1999/2000 as the sample employed to study the immediate effects of privatisation on TOCs’ 
performances and efficiency.  
 
Horizontal and vertical separation of the former state monopoly were adopted in order to implement 
competition in the passenger rail services. This competition was originally expected to derive from 
the competitive process for the allocation of the franchises, i.e., ‘competition for the market’, and 
subsequently to become ‘competition in the market’ by allowing increasing degrees of open access 
operation over time. There are additional merits to unbundling and creating a large number of 
downstream operators. In a regulated industry, like the railway, the regulator has the hard task of 
ensuring that companies behave in a ‘competitive-like fashion’ even when they hold monopoly 
licences. The ability to reach this outcome rests on the amount and quality of information that the 
regulator – who is at an informational disadvantage - is able to extract. Having a larger number of 
downstream operators makes this task easier. By combining data from different operators, and 
comparing information on companies’ outputs and performance levels, it has been possible in other 
privatised industries to establish a comparative efficiency framework, within which the regulator 
can identify the relative abilities of the different operators.  
 
Establishing such framework is of great importance in the railways for two main reasons. First, 
because of the large public subsidy and with the need for the regulator to ensure that the taxpayers 
are getting ‘good value for money’. And second, because the regulator will have better information 
available when having to decide about renewal of franchises and consolidation of existing ones. We   5
compute Tornqvist indices, and use data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) to examine how relative efficiency and productivity unfold through the privatisation 
process and to assess the relationship between efficiency and operating environment. The analysis 
intends to shed some light on the successes and failures of the UK’s most criticised privatisation to 
date. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the background and lays out the hypotheses 
tested. Section 3 summarises the previous literature on railway efficiency. Section 4 describes the 
data and section 5 looks at the methodology adopted. Section 6 reports the results of the analysis, 
and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background and Hypotheses  
According to some industry experts, British Rail operated its network on a “make-do, least-cost 
basis” (Humphrey, 2001), it never developed the system in order to transform it into a proper 
standardised network. BR managers got around problems rather than solving them. A large number 
of operations were based on personal experience. Some claim (e.g. Dunwoody, 2001) that vertical 
separation has destroyed the ‘sense of ownership’ of people who used to work in the industry, and 
this has resulted in the poor performance experienced by the privatised industry to date. 
Fragmentation, it has been claimed (Dunwoody, 2001), is the main cause of the alleged poor 
performance of passenger railways since privatisation. This leaves the main question still open as to 
what is the best structure for this industry. 
 
An economic interpretation of the facts suggests that the restructuring has eliminated that ‘ad-
hoc’, personal management style, thus revealing the lack of a proper managerial system of the 
capital asset base, as well as (in some instances) of operations. The privatisation and vertical   6
separation of this industry have revealed (belatedly) pre-existing failures of the system 
(specifically the backlog of network investment). Moreover, the demand for passenger rail 
services is pro-cyclical and the last years have demonstrated that continued economic growth 
associated with government policies aimed at reducing motoring traffic for private usage can 
generate extremely high levels of demand.
1  This has put great pressure on the existing, 
historically under-funded, network.  
 
Given this background and the additional restrictions (especially speed restrictions) imposed on 
the system following the rail accident at Hatfield, it is perhaps not surprising that the passenger 
railway services have not produced a satisfactory performance. On the other hand, the 
performance of BR, i.e.: of pre-privatisation times, was renowned among rail users for being 
highly unsatisfactory. It is important, therefore, to objectively examine and understand how post-
privatisation performance compares with British Rail’s performance, and to understand whether 
productivity and efficiency in the industry have been improving since privatisation.  
 
This study is going to test three main sets of hypotheses.  
 
Our first set of hypotheses concerns the effects of the privatisation on efficiency in the industry 
at the point of service provision both as an aggregate and across TOCs. The major driver behind 
the UK’s privatisation program was the desire to improve the efficiency of poorly performing 
state owned companies. We would expect that privatisation would improve the level of 
efficiency of train operating companies in line with the general findings from studies of 
privatisation around the world (see Megginson and Netter, 2001). We might additionally expect 
that the competitive process and the diffusion of best practice might reduce the dispersion of 
                                                 
1 Demand for rail services has increased at an unprecedented and unpredicted rate of 6 % per annum from 1995 to 
2000.   7
efficiencies between the TOCs. However we recognise that the scope for this to happen is 
limited by dispersion in rolling stock and track infrastructure quality. 
 
Our second set of hypotheses examines the determinants of efficiency for the TOCs. The TOCs 
are not an homogeneous set of companies producing identical products with the same technology 
and environmental factors. We might expect that efficiency is at least partially a function of the 
operating environment of the train operating companies – companies operating long distance 
routes might for instance enjoy efficiency advantages relative to companies operating in low 
customer density regions. We might also expect that the considerable variation among TOCs in 
the age of the rolling stock used might influence operating costs and output and hence efficiency 
(Affuso and Newbery, 2000; and Dunwoody, 2001).  
 
Our final set of hypotheses focuses on the relationship between safety and service quality and efficiency. It has been suggested, especially 
following the October 2000 Hatfield crash, that safety and service quality have been compromised in the privatised network. This implies the 
hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between efficiency and these variables at the individual TOC level. However it may be that 
variations in performance are explained by some of the environmental factors mentioned in the previous paragraph. A more positive view would 
be that efficiency, safety and quality of service are all outcomes of superior management and that they are complements rather than substitutes. 
 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
Based on the type of techniques employed for assessing productivity, the vast literature on 
productivity and efficiency measures applied to railway companies or systems is typically 
grouped in two broad strands, namely ‘Index Numbers’ and ‘Econometric Methods’ (Oum et al., 
1999). Index number methodologies are a set of deterministic and non-parametric procedures 
employed for measuring productivity at each unit level. Unlike statistical cost and production 
function approaches, these methods present the advantage of not requiring strong a priori 
assumptions regarding the production technology or the error structure, and allow for multiple 
inputs and multiple outputs.  However, because they do not assume companies’ outcomes as   8
random, their main drawback is that efficiency scores computed in this fashion are, indeed, 
sensitive to outliers (Oum et al., 1992).  
 
In most cases, applications of such methodologies are subsequently followed by a second stage 
in which censored models are employed to explain the source of efficiency differences. 
Thretheway  et al. (1997), for instance, compute single factor productivity indices and 
multilateral total factor productivity indices (TFP) for two Canadian railway companies in 1956-
91. Oum et al. (1994) and Cantos et al. (1999) apply DEA, a linear programming technique for 
computing non-parametric efficiency frontier functions and efficiency scores, to a set of 
companies from different countries. The latter, in particular, employ a long lasting period (from 
1970 to 1995). This allows isolating technological advances from changes in productivity levels, 
and identifying periods of quick improvement in efficiency. 
 
In Thretheway et al. (1997), TFP growth indices are regressed on a number of factors. Their 
evidence indicates that increments in the volume of freight and passengers, and higher average 
freight hauls have a positive effect on TFP growth. For a given number of passenger miles, on 
the other hand, increasing the length of passenger trips has a negative effect in productivity 
growth records. Focusing on the effect of market characteristics, and other operating and 
institutional aspects not under managers’ command, Oum et al. (1994) contemplate for the first 
time the effects of managerial autonomy, which was considered in many applications thereafter. 
In their study, the authors discover a positive correlation between managerial autonomy and 
DEA scores, and a negative one between the latter and public subsidies. In Cantos et al. (1999) 
managerial autonomy appears to be a source of critical importance influencing increases in 
productivity records. In fact, efficiency scores are discovered to be positively correlated with the 
degree of management and financial autonomy, and as in Thretheway et al. (1997), with   9
passengers and tonnes per train. In this paper, the authors also discover a positive correlation 
with the percentage of electrified tracks.  
 
With similar concern on managerial autonomy Cowie (1999) employs DEA to decompose 
technical efficiency in managerial and organisational efficiency scores in public and private 
railway companies’ groups in Switzerland. By doing so the author discovers that management 
appears to be extremely efficient in private companies, which reach a score mean of 95%. 
According to his evidence, differences in managerial efficiency among both groups of companies 
accounts for almost the whole gap between technical efficiency records, leaving an almost null 
organisational efficiency score. Since organisational restrictions affecting public companies are 
not uniform across the country, the results lead the author, then, to hypothesise that a less 
efficient pattern may be characteristic in most public companies.  
 
Using a Tornqvist Productivity Index, Cowie (2002) investigates British passenger railways' 
increases in productivity under the privatised period. He finds that most of the increases 
exhibited after privatisation are gains due to short run measures and that, compared with BR 
these haven't been as strong as in the later years of the nationalised industry. He concludes that 
the re-focusing of the industry towards a more market-orientated structure appears to be the 
moment when the most important gains in productivity were achieved.  
 
Finally, Pollitt and Smith (2002), employ social cost-benefit analysis to assess the operating 
efficiency changes resulting from privatisation in the Great Britain railway industry. They find 
that cost efficiency gains resulting from privatisation allowed the industry to achieve efficiency 
savings of 18% (or 2.7% per annum) between 1992-93 and 1999-00. This, however, compares 
with an efficiency decline of around 1% per annum (adjusting for declining output) over the final 
comparable five year period of British Rail between 1988-89 and 1992-93.    10
 
As a second approach, econometric methods account for the randomness in the company’s 
behaviour, identifying changes in productivity by the estimation of production or cost functions. 
A characteristic drawback of this approach, however, is that an a priori imposition of the frontier 
functional form and of the distribution of the error term is needed for the estimations.  
 
Cost functions are typically employed to account for the multiple output characteristic of the 
railways industry. Caves et al. (1980a), for instance, in a path breaking study of US and 
Canadian railroad companies employ them by applying a two-step method. First, a variable cost 
function is estimated; subsequently, partial cost elasticities are computed and employed in 
weighting the different outputs. By proceeding in this way the authors obtain significantly lower 
productivity increments than those which typically resulted from employing conventional 
weights. Based in this methodology, further work by these authors finds that Canadian 
companies perform better with higher TFP growth, especially during the sixties, when they 
operated under a more deregulated environment than in the US (Caves et al,. 1981a). These 
procedures, commonly known as ‘average function estimation techniques’, are widely used in 
the railway productivity literature.
2 Nevertheless, this methodology implicitly assumes that all 
firms are successful in reaching the efficient frontier. This is an obviously too strong assumption 
in which the validity of OLS estimations of the efficient frontier relies. Variable efficiency 
between firms is, on the other hand, consistent with stochastic frontier functions, which then 
allow for potentially inefficient performances, by explicitly incorporating an inefficiency term in 
the stochastic component of each model. 
 
Corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) consist of a first attempt in the direction to estimate a production frontier function where efficiency 
varies across units. Following this approach, the efficient frontier is defined by shifting the intercept in OLS estimations. This result is obtained 
by subtracting to this one the residual with the highest value. Perelman and Pestieau’s (1988) paper is a starting point for this set of applications 
                                                 
2  See, for example, Andrikopoulos et al. (1998), Caves et al. (1980b and 1981b), De Borger (1991), Filippini et al. 
(1992), Friedlander et al. (1993), Gathon et al. (1989), Wilson (1997).    11
to railway systems. In this study, they isolate inefficiency measures from factors that are not under the managers’ control, a number of 
environmental variables which they include in the estimated function.
3   
 
Perhaps the main drawback of COLS in that in providing efficiency scores, this methodology does not allow for considering noise or 
measurement errors in companies’ performances. SFA is used precisely to raise this flaw. Cantos et al. (2000) for instance apply this technique to 
estimate a stochastic cost frontier function for 15 European companies. The sources of efficiency performances are then examined and similarly 
to Oum et al. (1994), in this case mnagerial and financial autonomy, and the intensity in the usage of the network are the identified sources of 
enhancement of the levels of efficiency, whereas an increase in the number of passengers per train would have a negative impact on efficiency.  
 
This common two-stage method, however, is critisized by Tsionas and Christopoulos (1999) in 
the case of the stochastic approaches. Due to the implicit assumption needed in the first stage 
that exogenous variables do not affect efficiency scores, this methodology produces biased 
estimations in both steps. The authors proceed, instead, by using an index of disembodied 
technical change in a translog production function, adding variables in an attempt to control for 
exogenous effects. As in the aforementioned deterministic approach the inefficiencies are found 
to be explained by higher freight and passenger loads, and higher electrification. Trip length, on 
the other hand, produces a negative effect. 
 
On a separate note, railway production multiple-output and multiple-input technologies are 
captured by the estimation of distance function in Coelli and Perelman (1999). Following this 
approach there is no implicit decision needed for aggregation of input and outputs. Further, 
Fuentes et al (2001) adopt this methodology in order to estimate a multi-output multi-input 
estimation of total factor productivity changes in the Spanish insurance industry. The authors 
also recommend a way to decompose such changes based on the parameters estimated from the 
distance functions. This methodology is employed in current paper, and it is explained in more 
detail in Section 5. 
 
Despite the differences in approaches and techniques adopted in order to measure technical 
efficiency of the railway sector and its determinants, some common patterns emerge from the 
reviewed studies.  First, in order to compare companies’ performances it is crucial to isolate 
                                                 
3 See also Deprins and Simar (1989) for a similar application with focus on the impact of exogenous effects on 
companies’ performances.   12
exogenous sources for better performances from productivity gains. Most of the studies reviewed 
suggest that in the presence of market signals such as incentives for managers’ strategies, which are 
identified by manager’s autonomy variables and by the companies’ financial independence, a 
consistently positive correlation with efficiency scores appears across the studies. Similar evidence 
is collected when electrification rates are considered in order to control for energy cost saving 
services. Efficiency scores computed with passenger miles as the industry outcome seem to be 
positively correlated to the passenger load and negatively correlated to the length of the trip, 
revealing trains travelling below passenger capacity; whereas the converse occurs when train miles 
is the measure for the output.  Second, the cost structure in the industry is usually characterised by 
the combination of labour, energy and a fixed input (namely, equipment coaches, land and/or ways 
and structure), while treatment given to account for the multi-product characteristic of the industry 
varies depending on the methodology applied. The rail industry’s outcome may be represented by 
an aggregation of different freight and passenger service measures, especially if production 
functions are to be estimated. Cost function estimations, DEA analysis and distance function 
estimations, though, allow considering these variables separately. Third, even when the quality of 
the services is reckoned as an important characteristic of the industry’s outcome, companies’ 
performances are never compared according to this feature because of the lack of reliable measures. 
Fourth, various studies apply a two-step estimation method to control for the firm-specific factors 
that impact on the efficiency scores. Tsionas et al (1999) remark bias problems that such way of 
proceeding would embody when estimating stochastic frontiers. They then  proceed by estimating 
frontier functions and controlling the exogenous effects in one step. In this paper we follow their 
recommendation. Finally, by estimating distance functions, the parametric approach gained a great 
deal of flexibility, and further use is possible following the decomposition technique suggested by 
Fuentes et al (op. cit.). Such procedure allows considering the different components explaining total 
factor productivity changes to be estimated using parametric and non-parametric techniques. In 
Section 6 we present results comparing both sets of methodologies.   13
 
4. Data 
In order to assess immediate effects on productivity of British railway privatisation, we examine 
information on service provision over the period 1994/95 to 1999/2000. Whilst BR data describe 
the industry’s behaviour in the two years prior to the reform, the dataset includes a panel of 
yearly data for 24 passenger franchisees from the year 1996/97 onwards.
4 We do not look at the 
data after 1999/2000 because we wish to focus on the examination of the impact of privatisation 
prior to the Hatfield crash in October 2000. Smith (2006) discusses the significant negative 
impact of the Hatfield crash on the cost performance of both the network company and the 
TOCs. Recent work for the Office of the Rail Regulator draws attention to the additional 
modelling issues raised by attempts to model the recent performance of BR successor companies 
(Smith, Wheat and Nixon, 2008). In order to compare the whole industry's performance after 
privatisation with that of BR prior to it, we use an aggregate of all TOCs in the period 
immediately following the reform. For efficiency change comparison across franchisee service 
providers however, only the period starting in 1996/7 is used, leaving for this purpose a total of 
96 data-points.   
 
Each TOC’s cost structure is described both according to the physical inputs under managerial 
control (labour and rolling stocks) and by assessing monetary costs in labour and other operating 
expenditures. As TOCs had to pay for almost all capital components involved in their production 
process during this period, ours constitutes a very thorough and accurate depiction of the 
productive process in the industry. Industry’s output is measured by considering train miles and 
passenger miles. The variable train miles gauges the industry’s capacity availability, whilst the 
level of services actually consumed is assessed by the variable passenger miles. The former 
denotes capacity provision by the TOCs as part of their service provision requirements as 
                                                 
4 Because of its minute size, Island Line constitutes an outlier among TOCs and is therefore dropped from our 
analysis.   14
franchisees. The latter, instead, represents TOCs’ success in attracting passengers. The source for 
these variables is OPRAF’s Annual Reports, which also provide further information on 
punctuality measures, the industry’s workforce in numbers, labour and other operative costs 
expended by the whole industry, and the contract length remaining for the companies. TOCs' 
accounts are used to extract information on each company’s labour and other operative expenses, 
and about the number of employees belonging to each TOC in the privatised period. 'BR and 
Coaching Stock' yearly reports provide a detailed description of all rolling stocks employed in 
the industry, and it is the source employed to account for the number of units utilized in service 
provision. Finally, Health and Safety Executive produces information about ‘Signals Passed at 




An overview of the industry’s performance is given in Table 1. Both considering passenger miles 
and train miles, reported in columns 2 and 3, the industry exhibits a steady increase in services 
provided during the period studied. As mentioned, two types of variables are used to measure the 
allocation of inputs in the industry. The results are reported under columns 4 to 8. First, monetary 
costs indicate that, conversely to the aforementioned increase in the services, the industry exhibited 
a concomitant 13% reduction in the total input costs, achieved with an almost 20% of savings in 
labour costs and a decline of more than 10% in other operating expenditures. Second, the size of 
the workforce shows a pattern which is different than the total amount of locomotives, coaches and 
other units used in the production process. While the number of employees decreased by almost 
20%, a proportion similar to the decline in the labour cost, rolling stock units increased in the first 
years of privatised industry. 
 
                                                 
5 Using SPADs as an indicator of safety presents drawbacks, though. First, they are only one aspect of safety on the 
network (deaths or accidents being examples of other indicators). Second, failures to deliver on this ground may be 
Network Rail responsibility, rather than to the corresponding TOC. Despite such flaws, this information presents 
important advantages which make it advisable to be employed. It is available at the TOC level and non-zero values 
are exhibited for every company in every year of our sample, so no latent pieces of information are needed.   15
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 reports information about the quality of the services provided, which is gauged by by 
combining punctuality measures with information about SPADs. The corresponding indices are 
constructed as follows:  
 
1000   e g  on  tim s  arrivin   of train percentage y index punctualit × =                 (1) 
  
s train mile
SPADs ex  safety ind ⋅ = 50 - 1000                                             
(2) 
 
The higher the value observed in each of the above indices, the better the industry performs 
regarding quality standards. Overall, following privatisation the industry has made a continuous 
improvement in the provision of safe services. Similar pattern is described in Evans (2002). In 
this paper, the author ascertains that fewer fatal and non-fatal accidents have occurred in the 
recent years than might have been expected on the basis of the tendency established by BR and, 
he rejects the hypothesis of an increasing drift in the number of fatalities per accident. 
Subsequent work (Evans, 2007) backs up this analysis and leads to the conclusion ‘that there is 
no evidence for the hypothesis that railway safety, as measured by accidents, has become worse 
since privatisation.’ (p.520). Punctuality measures reported in Table 2 column 2, on the other 
hand, highlight a striking improvement at the point of reform implementation, but the 
performance has been erratic thereafter.
6 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
6 Two other widely reported measures of quality are reliability and passengers in excess of capacity (PIXC). The 
former assess the proportion of scheduled trains arriving at their destinations. These measures exhibit remarkably 
little variation across TOCs and along time. PIXC measures the amount of overcrowding on trains on the London 
commuter lines only and there is no data for the BR period.    16
 
In order to explain efficiency performance in each TOC, we employ the following information, 
an overview of which variables is reported in Table 2.
7 Regional GVA per capita is average gross 
value added per head for the counties in which the corresponding TOC operates. Contract length 
remaining is the number of years lasting to the end of the franchise contract. This may be 
important because it affects the willingness of the TOCs to invest in cost reduction. Finally, Age 
of the rolling stock represents the average maturity of the rolling stock since each unit was built. 
While the age of the rolling stock employed does not basically change during the period under 
analysis, the average contract length declines by about one year at a time, denoting non-
important contractual changes until the last year observed where the franchise was severely 
reduced for four TOCs. Dummy variables characterise the type of services supplied by assigning 
to each company 1 or 0 to indicate the presence of former Intercity, Network South East and 
Regional Railways providers.  
 
To wrap up this description, Table 3 illustrates about relevant differences in the characteristics 
observed across types of services provided by TOCs. Former Regional Trains (RT) present the 
highest train miles records with very low ratios of physical inputs per train miles operated. 
However, it also exhibits the highest ratios of employees and rolling stock per passenger mile in 
the industry. On the other hand, former Intercity Trains (IT) are responsible for around half of 
the rolling stock per passenger miles than their counterparts and, similar to the former Network 
South East (NSE), they present very low proportions of employees per passenger miles. IT and 
NSE’s performances, however, are characterised by higher numbers of employees and rolling 
stock than RT. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
7 Data sources are presented in Appendix 1.   17
 
5. Methodology 
Total factor productivity change is assessed by means of two different indices, namely the 
Törnqvist Total Factor Productivity index (TPI) and the Malmqüist Total Factor Productivity 
index (MPI). Törnqvist indices (TI) compute weighted geometric averages in the following 
fashion. Take an index variable X indicating change patterns of J components, which we 
initialize as j. Average increment in X between period t and t+l is, then, computed as a weighted 
geometric average of each component’s increment, with weights given by the average shares of 
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where ωjt represents variable X value share weights at time t. It is possible, therefore, to define 
TPI as the ratio of two TIs, indicating changes in outputs, divided by changes in inputs. 
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Further, multi-output, multi-input TPI is computed as a weighted average of outputs (yit) and 
inputs (xit), employing the following formulae: 
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where ωjt and νjt represent output and input value share weights at time t. 
 
With MPI, total factor productivity changes may be decomposed in an industry-wide 
productivity change over time on the one side and the efficiency changes at each level of the 
operating unit on the other. Following Coelli and Perelman (1996, 1999) we provide 
‘methodology cross-checking’ of efficiency scores comparing results obtained with the non-
parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique and the parametric stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) estimation of input oriented distance functions.  
 
In this paper, DEA and SFA applications involve the use of input orientated distance functions. 
This is so, in regard of the regulations operating over the delivery of the services. By taking this 
approach, we assume that TOCs are free to vary costs but are constrained in their decisions over 
the service that they deliver vary output (a standard assumption for regulated industries).  
 
Input orientated distance functions can be illustrated by first defining the production technology 
as L(y) = {x: x can produce y}. Then, the input oriented distance function defined on the period t 
benchmark technology is:  ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
t t t t t
I y L x y x D ∈ = δ δ : max , . This magnitude corresponds to 
the maximum value required to deflate the input vector employed by the considered TOC in 
period t onto the production surface of a benchmark fixed in the same period. Note that, when δ 
is maximised x/δ measures the minimum amount of inputs needed to produce a given amount of 
outputs, which is achieved by the most efficient unit.  
 
In terms of the Figure 1, dots Mt and Mt+1 represent decision-making unit M plotted in input x-
output y space. Mt represents input-output vector M(xt, yt), while Mt+1 stands for the equivalent in 
the following period. The efficient boundaries define two diverse technologies. Period-t   19
technology is represented by the line labelled as ‘Period-t efficient boundary’, and the distances 
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
  
MPI is introduced in the rail industry literature by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (CCD, 1982). 
In their seminal article these authors compare two input-output vectors with a benchmark 
technology using radial input scaling. Following this definition MPI due to CCD corresponds to: 
 
11 (,) ( , ) tt t tt t t
ii I MPI D x y D x y ++ =                                                   (6) 
 
Notice as well that, in the case depicted in Figure 1, MPI
t
i ≥ 1 evidencing a positive TFP growth 
from period t to period t+1. In the same fashion both performances might be compared using 
technology in period t+1 as a benchmark. In fact,   ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 , ,
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provide different results over the same phenomenon. 
 
To avert this inconsistency, Färe, Grosskopf, Lindgren and Roos (FGLR, 1989) defined their 
MPI as the geometric mean of both definitions. Subsequently (FGLR, 1994), they further proved 
that this index could be computed by DEA and the estimated index decomposed in technical and 
efficiency changes. Their result for the index is: 
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which can be decomposed into: 
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Interpreted in terms of distances defined in Figure 1 the latter turns to: 
[]
[] () () [] 2
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t ⋅ ⋅ = . The first term captures evidence regarding the catch-up 
performance of the decision-making unit with the rest of the industry. It compares the technical 
efficiency measure in period t+1 with the equivalent magnitude in period t. Technical change 
measures denote the boundary shift in the industry’s technology between the two periods 
evaluated by computing a geometric mean of this magnitude at xt+1 and xt. Efficiency scores are 
computed by assuming constant returns to scale (CRS), therefore capturing all productivity 
changes, including those attributable to changes in the scale size, as a departure of the best 
practise technology from the benchmark technology (see Fare et al, 1994).   21
 
DEAP software (Version 2.1) is applied to compute DEA scores, considering two different 
definitions of the production process. In the first place, we employ train miles and passenger 
miles as the outputs considered and we use value measures to account for the inputs (i.e. labour 
costs and other operating expenditures). Further, a second application is performed employing 
instead inputs defined in units (i.e.:  employees and rolling stock). Subsequently, in a second 
stage, computed scores are regressed against the age of rolling stock in year 1997, type of service 
provided, contract length remaining and regional GVA per capita in 1997 in the regions that 
were served by the TOCs as determinants of the efficiency performance. To do so we estimate a 
Tobit model considering the panel structure of the scores and regressors.
9  
 
Malmquist indices are also estimated using SFA. We follow CCD (1982) and, further, Fuentes, 
Grifell and Perelman (1998 and 2001), in their use of parametric distance functions to derive the 
SFA efficiency scores. The basic input distance function models the efficiency score assuming 
the translog form as an appropriate approximation for the distance function: 
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I y x D ,   is a function of K inputs and M outputs. To allow for the analysis of 
technological changes across the industry, a time trend is added in (11). By following this 
                                                 
9 Simar and Wilson (2007) criticise the use of a two-stage approach with Tobit regressions in the second stage, 
noting that the Data Generating Process (DGP) is not defined. However other studies such as Yang and Pollitt 
(2008) demonstrate that the two stage process is easy to implement relative to more sophisticated approaches and is 
well correlated with them. We also use second stage analyis with the SFA scores to maintain rough comparability in 
interpretation of the results between the DEA and SFA analysis.   22
approach SFA results become consistent with the DEA analysis and, consequently, they reflect 
the assumption that total factor productivity change is due to both efficiency changes and 
technical changes.  
 
Since input orientated distance functions are homogeneous of degree +1 in inputs, dividing 
through by an input or output as appropriate allows transforming the regression equation as 
follows:  
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* . Equation (10) may be rewritten as: 
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Then, as common in the literature, ln DIjt is set to be equal to εjt, a random variable such that: εjt 
=vjt - ujt
 , uit collects technical inefficiency effects. We estimate this model following Battese and 
Coelli (1995) approach, which allows controlling for environmental effects. According to this 
approach, technical effects are assumed to be independently distributed non-negative random 
variables; ujt are assumed independent from vjt; vjt is independent and identically distributed and 
ujt ~ truncated Normal(μjt,σ
2), where μjt=zjt . δ, and z jt  is a vector of firm-specific potential   23




As in Fuentes et al (1998, 2001), we apply SFA to equation (13) and the results are then 
employed to estimate the total factor productivity change and to decompose this magnitude in its 
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6.1 Privatisation and Efficiency 
The direct effects of privatisation on the whole train operation industry are first examined 
considering various applications with TPI indices. In all models considered passenger miles and 
train miles are the variables describing the outputs in the industry. We provide three measures of 
productivity performance in Table 4. Under the ‘Monetary cost model’ both the outputs are 
                                                 
10 There has been considerable recent discussion about how to model efficiency with panel data (see for example 
Farsi et al., 2006). Batesse and Coelli (1995) imposes the restriction that the ranks of the individual observations 
cannot change through time. This is a reasonable restriction in our case, as we have no priors to suggest they should 
change over a short period. By contrast Greene (2005) proposes a true random effects model which allows the ranks 
to change without restriction from year to year. However this almost certainly imposes too little panel structure on 
the data. 
11 Thanassoulis (2001).   24
weighted at 50% and the monetary inputs – both labour and other operating expenditure - are 
weighted as their corresponding shares in total cost. Under the ‘Costs in units’ we use number of 
employees and rolling stock as inputs and we provide two different measures of productivity 
changes. In both measures we apply equal weighted outputs. For costs, however, we consider 
two alternatives. In the first one, we assume weights similar to those used for the equivalent 
monetary inputs; for the second,  we impose  equal weights on the two inputs. 
 
Despite variations in the models chosen for each case, results presented in Table 4 exhibit a very 
distinctive pattern throughout the period chosen to examine the reform.  Very high efficiency 
improvements are characteristic of the industry both at the time of the reform and thereafter. This 
progression is driven by a consistent steep increase in the output of services. Cost savings are 
particularly marked in the year prior to private companies starting activities and in the very first 
year of the privatised system. In these transition years total expenditures are contracted in about 
5% each year, with considerable abatements in the number of employees, but also substantive 
ones in capital costs, such as the amount of rolling stocks employed.  Following the reform, cost 
contributions to efficiency are less important, despite the continuous decline exhibited in the 
number of employees in the industry. This is due to the similarly steady increase in the number 
of rolling stock employed. 
 
Similar to our examination of TPIs, in order to deal with the multiple characteristics of the output 
(availability of the service and actual transportation of passengers) we estimate a multi-
output/multi-input distance function. TFP is further decomposed both by applying DEA and also 
after estimating distance functions with SFA. For both types of analysis, we define the 
productive process in two ways, in a similar fashion to that employed to examine TPIs. The first 
model considers train miles and passenger miles as the industry’s output, where labour costs and 
other operating expenditures are considered as inputs. In the second model the same outputs are   25
included, whereas the inputs considered are rolling stock and employees. For the SFA 
application, the variables employed to define the environment in which each TOC operates are 
the same that we use in order to control for the efficiency scores in the stage following the DEA 
analysis. These are as follows: age of the rolling stock in year 1997, type of service provided as 
described in Section 3, contract length remaining and GVA per capita in 1997 in the regions that 
were served by the TOCs. All the variables employed, including the trend, are mean corrected. 
For breaking down the sources of TFP change, we employ Fuentes et al (2001) decomposition 
methods.  
 
As in Orea (2002), we start with SFA by testing for the null of total output elasticities being 
equal to | 1 |. At 1% confidence level, we do not reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to 
scale in any of the two models, so SFA is then performed on them by imposing constant returns 
to scale. In Table A.2, we include information on first order properties of the estimated input 
distance functions, as discussed in the literature (Fare et al, 1995). The purpose of this is to test 
how well behaved our estimated functions are. For the model defined in monetary costs, while 
monotonicity with respect to other expenditure holds for each observation, it fails in 20% of the 
cases for labour costs. In the model defined in input units the property is valid in 67% and 94% 
of the cases respectively. Likewise, the evidence related to the concavity in inputs of the distance 
function is mixed. While this property holds in all observations in the Monetary Costs model, it 
does not apply in 49 out of the 96 data-points in the Input Quantity model. We conclude that, 
although monotonicity does not succeed for all observations in our sample, the number of 
failures is relatively small in the case of the model estimating monetary costs. The Input 
Quantity model results are not as well-behaved as we would wish and should therefore be 
considered with caution. Table A.3 reports the SFA estimated distance functions for reference. 
Relevant coefficients have the correct signs. 
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Table 5 presents averaged DEA and SFA efficiency scores per year. The pattern shown by these 
magnitudes strongly depends on the method of computation performed. Whilst DEA outcomes 
are compatible with a substantial and stable productivity progress throughout the examined 
period, SFA methods only capture a relevant increment in the first year when the model is 
defined in monetary costs. Thereafter, those significant improvements in the industry fade. 
Different to all previous computations, SFA estimations performed with the model defined in 
input units produce very low scores, exhibiting a smooth decline throughout the period 
examined.  
 
[TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 6 reveals how these events relate to shifts in the production possibility boundary, i.e. to 
gains in productivity by the industry as a whole, and how much both outcomes combined 
modified the total factor productivity rate of the industry. First and similarly to TPI 
computations, evidence collected with DEA applications exhibit a striking increase in 
productivity gains in the industry of more than 5% on average during the first years after 
privatisation. Notice, however, that whilst the model with inputs in monetary costs displays even 
contributions between improvements achieved in technical and efficiency changes, efficiency 
changes absolutely predominate over technical changes in the model in units, reflecting 
differences across TOCs in savings on input amounts allocated to the service provision. These 
records probably reflect an increasing usage of rolling stock which varies across TOCs and a 
diminishing rate of efficiency gains made out of savings in the number of employees. Strikingly, 
the SFA results, however, lead to the judgement that nothing very relevant has happened in the 
industry after privatisation, as the method allocates most of the variations across the industry to 
random perturbations. According to this evidence, changes of no more than 1% on average show 
neither any relevant change in TOCs efficiency, nor any outward shift in the position of the   27
frontier. Despite such important differences, however, DEA and SFA scores exhibit a reasonable 
and significant correlation (at 1% significance level) using the four years of data and for just 
1999/2000 data presented in Tables 7 and 8.
 12  
 
[TABLES 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
While it is easy to demonstrate that privatisation was associated with positive productivity 
growth, it is not transparent whether privatisation improved productivity growth. This is because 
train operation cannot be separated from the rest of railway operation in the BR accounts prior to 
1994-95 when the company was already being prepared for its privatisation. The closest 
counterfactual we have is Pollitt and Smith (2002) who suggest that prior privatisation 
productivity was falling at 1% per annum. To assess whether, in the absence of privatisation 
productivity would have remained constant, we test the null of average productivity growth 
being null for each TOC. We can significantly reject this at the 1% level.
13 Privatisation does 
appear to have improved performance significantly relative to the pre-privatisation trend. 
 
6.2 Explaining TOC Efficiency 
Table 9 reports Tobit regressions performed with a panel dataset of DEA scores. Age of rolling 
stock  affects negatively the productivity performance of the TOCs, whereas contract length 
remaining and the relative wealth between regions do not show any significant impact on 
efficiency scores. Former regional services are shown to be at a particular advantage in terms of 
efficiency with significantly positive parameter values in regressions involving the inputs 
defined in values. In both models, though, Former Intercity exhibit a favourable difference. 
Finally, there is a significant trend indicating significant non-explained increment in efficency. 
                                                 
12 Similar patterns in these results are obtained when we calculate a weighted average in which the weights are 
calculated as the share of the total costs in each TOC with respect to similar magnitude exhibited by the industry. 
The same counts for the discussion given over results presented about Table 5. 
13 We use t-tests of sample means for the DEA measures and the t-tests on the time trend for the SFA measures.    28
 
Turning to SFA models, environmental effects are captured by considering control variables in 
Battese and Coelli (1995) model. As Table A.3 shows, the negative sign of these parameters, 
indicates the relationship with mean efficiency. Once again Age in 1997 has a negative impact on 
efficiency while contract length remaining in 1997 and GVA per capita present a non-significant 
effect on efficiency in the input quantities model. This leads us to suggest that Intercity services, 
served by companies with newer trains and longer franchises exhibit higher indicators of 
efficiency. 
 
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6.3 Safety, punctuality and efficiency 
Tables 7 and 8 also report correlations between safety, punctuality and efficiency scores 
exhibited by TOCs. The full 4-year dataset shows a negative but non-significant Pearson 
correlation coefficient for the relationship between punctuality and safety – this suggests there is 
weak evidence of a negative trade-off between more punctual and safer trains. Safety seems to 
be positively related to efficiency scores for the full sample, but again, this is only significant in 
one case. Punctuality, on the other hand, is significantly negatively correlated with efficiency at 
least for the full dataset.  
 
To avert spurious correlations originated in the presence of a time trend in the variables involved 
we compute the Pearson correlation coefficient to the data collected for the final data year 
1999/2000. In general, the estimated coefficients are non-significant, while the safety variable 
still presents evidence of a positive correlation with the SFA efficiency score. Overall there 
would seem to be no support for the claim that higher economic efficiency is associated with less   29
safety and weak evidence that punctuality and efficiency are negatively correlated. We can 
conclude that safer trains are associated with less punctuality but more input efficiency.  
 
7. Conclusions  
This paper has attempted to analyse the efficiency record of the Britain’s Train Operating 
Companies in the years immediately following privatisation using both DEA and SFA 
methodologies. We investigated three sets of hypotheses concerning efficiency. 
 
We observe that privatisation has been associated with a significant improvement in the total 
factor productivity boosted by important improvements in technical change and moderate ones in 
efficiency change. This improvement in efficiency is more meaningful when measured through 
the changes in the amount of inputs employed. In general, the substantial improvements 
experienced by the industry are largely driven by the massive rise in output over the period and 
the impressive reduction in real operating costs. 
 
On the determinants of efficiency we observe that there is a trend improvement in efficiency but 
differences in efficiency between TOCs are associated with the age of the rolling stock, the type 
of network operated, and the contract length remaining. 
 
On the relationship between safety, punctuality and efficiency we observe that whereas 
differences in safety appear to be weakly associated with differences in efficiency, punctuality is 
negatively but significantly correlated with the efficiency of performance. Overall we might 
tentatively conclude that more economically efficient TOCs are safer, but that safer TOCs are 
less punctual.  
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While the rail crash of October 2000 and the subsequent placing into administration of the 
network operator have dented public confidence in the British railway system, the observed 
effects of privatisation are that there were significant improvements in the productivity of train 
operators over the period examined. Even after this good performance there was still room for 
considerable improvement in efficiency in absolute terms, in spite of the constraints of   
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(In number)    (no of units)
1995  222 17806 1015  4260  5275  46880  10791 
1996  231 18154 1011  4008  5019  45689  10265 
1997  229 19861  905  3875  4780  43935  10207 
1998  237 21291  864  3900  4764  40229  10585 
1999  249 22351  841  3890  4731  39139  10871 


















     000£ (1996/7) (in years)  (in years) 
1995  89600 869  20554  n.a.  16.8 
1996  89500 869  21009  n.a.  16.5 
1997  92500 889  21575  8.4  17.0 
1998  92500 882  22237  7.4  17.6 
1999  91500 903  22695  6.4  16.0 




Table 3.  Passenger Rail Services in the Britain.  
Inputs and Outputs by Groups of Services  
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Per Company Per year  Former Regional Railways Former Intercity  Former Network South East
Train Miles (TM, mn)            13.39  7.09  9.96 
Passenger Miles (PM, mn)  554 1146  995 
Labour Costs (£1000s)  38956 32617  35749 
Other Operative Expenses 
(£1000s)  159869 180250  147509 
Employees (no.)  1938 1540  1612 
Rolling Stock (no.)  339 359  578 
Employees per TM  145 217  162 
Rolling Stock per TM  25 51  58 
Employees per PM  3.5 1.34  1.62 
Rolling Stock per PM  0.61 0.31  0.58 
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Table 4. Productivity changes assessed by Törnqvist Total Factor Productivity index 
                   (in %) 
 
 Monetary  cost 
model 
Costs in units  
(monetary cost shares) 
Costs in units  
(equal shares) 
1994/5 to 1995/6  7.9 7.5 6.7 
1995/6 to 1996/7  8.9 5.3 6.3 
1996/7 to 1997/8  5.5 3.9 7.8 
1997/8 to 1998/9  5.6 3.2 4.9 




Table 5. Efficiency Scores 
 
    D E A      S C O R E S  S F A      S C O R E S 











Average TOC's Performance  1997 0.835  0.695  0.801  0.532 
  1998 0.852  0.711  0.821  0.529 
  1999 0.866  0.730  0.826  0.527 
 2000  0.900  0.797  0.826  0.526 
 
 
Table 6.   Total factor productivity changes. Average of the TOCs Performances 
 
      TORNQVIST      MPI   DEA    RESULTS         MPI  SFA  RESULTS      


















1994/5 to 1995/6  1.079        
  1995/6 to 1996/7  1.089        
  1996/7 to 1997/8  1.055  1.021 1.038 1.060 1.026 0.984 1.010 
  1997/8 to 1998/9  1.056  1.019 1.040 1.060 1.007 0.991 0.998 
   1998/9 to 1999/2000  1.079  1.038 1.036 1.076 0.998 0.998 0.996 




1994/5 to 1995/6 
1.075       
   1995/6 to 1996/7  1.053       
   1996/7 to 1997/8  1.039  1.022 1.052 1.075 1.000 0.987 0.987 
   1997/8 to 1998/9  1.032  1.030 1.021 1.052 1.000 0.992 0.992 
   1998/9 to 1999/2000  1.037  1.102 0.948 1.044 1.000 0.997 0.997 
   mean 1.047  1.051  1.006  1.057 1.000 0.992 0.992 
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Punctuality  1                
Safety -0.1048  1           
DEA-Monetary Costs  -0.2256**  0.1976  1        
DEA-Input Quantities  -0.2284**  0.2964*  0.7741*  1      
SFA-Monetary Costs  -0.1734***  0.1741  0.8280*  0.5166*  1    
SFA-Input Quantities  -0.1970*** 0.1972 0.4615*  0.5846*  0.5191*  1 
 
* represents coefficient significant with a 1 % significance level. 
**   Similar to the previous line with a 5 % significance level. 
***     represents coefficient significant with a 10 % significance level. 
 
 
Table 8: Safety, Punctuality and Efficiency. Pearson correlation coefficients.  
(Results for year 1999/2000) 
 












Punctuality  1                
Safety -0.2705  1           
DEA-Monetary Costs  -0.0702  -0.134  1        
DEA-Input Quantities  -0.0773  0.2154  0.8108*  1      
SFA-Monetary Costs  -0.1725  -0.0623  0.7233*  0.4530**  1    
SFA-Input Quantities  -0.2192 0.5163*  0.3380  0.5526*  0.3917**  1 
 
* represents coefficient significant with a 1 % significance level. 
**   Similar to the previous line with a 5 % significance level. 
***     represents coefficient significant with a 10 % significance level. 
 
 
Table 9: Explaining TOC DEA Efficiency Scores: Tobit Regression Analysis 
 
  
Input in  
monetary values  Inputs in units 
   Coefficient  z  Coefficient  z 
Age in 1997  -0.014 -4.890  -0.030  -8.220 
Former intercities  0.142 3.050  0.239  3.790 
Former regional  0.201 3.720  0.031  0.440 
Contract length remaining in 1997  -0.002 -0.400  -0.001  -0.070 
GVA in 1997  -6.57E-06 -0.820  -1.53E-07 -0.010 
Trend  0.028 2.270  0.038  2.350 
Constant  1.103 6.710  1.087  4.980 
LR chi2(6)    52.09    69.52 
Observations   96    96 





Table A.1: Data Sources 
 
Train Miles  OPRAF and SRA Annual Reports (1996/97 - 1999/2000). 
  BR Annual Reports (1994/95 - 1995/96) 
Passenger Miles  OPRAF and SRA Annual Reports (1996/97 - 1999/2000). 
  BR Annual Reports (1994/95 - 1995/96) 
Punctuality   OPRAF and SRA Annual Reports (1996/97 - 1999/2000). 
  BR Annual Reports (1994/95 - 1995/96) 
SPADs - Safety  Health and Safety Executive (April 2000). SPAD Report.  
Labour Cost  British Railways and Train Operating Companies Accounts (1994/95 -
1999/2000) 
Other Operating Expenditures British Railways and Train Operating Companies Accounts (1994/95 -
1999/2000) 
Employees  British Railways and Train Operating Companies Accounts (1994/95 -
1999/2000) 
Rolling Stock  British Railways Locomotives and Coaching Stock (1994 - 2000). 
Contract Length Remaining  OPRAF and SRA Annual Reports (1996/97 - 1999/2000). 
Incentives  OPRAF and SRA Annual Reports (1996/97 - 1999/2000). 
Service supplied  Expert Survey. 
Age  British Railways Locomotives and Coaching Stock (1994 - 2000). 
Regional GVA per capita  Cambridge Econometrics Consultants. 
Excessive subsidy  Preston et al. (2000). 
 
 
Table A.2: Monotonicity and concavity in SFA estimations (96 observations) 
 












∂   96 64 
Failure to concavity in inputs  0  49 
 
Note: Other inputs account for Other Operating Expenditures, in the  model with monetary 
costs; rolling stock in  the model defined in input units.    41
 




       
Monetary 
Costs Model     Input Quantities Model 
       coefficient t-ratio  coefficient t-ratio 
   Intercept  α0  0.258 7.446  0.643 0.905 
Inputs  ln x1  β1  0.099 0.902  0.823 8.990 
   ln x2  β2  0.901 8.174 0.177 1.933 
   (ln x1)(lnx1)  β11  0.687 2.204  -0.265  -0.825 
   (ln x1)(ln x2)  β12  -1.374 -4.409 0.529 1.651 
   (ln x2)(lnx2)  β22  0.687 2.204 -0.265 -0.825 
Outputs  ln y1  α1  -0.652 
-
17.561 -0.191  -1.757 
   ln y2  α2  -0.348 -9.390 -0.809 -7.436 
   (ln y1)(ln y1)  α11  -0.380 -0.093 -0.311 -0.073 
   (ln y2)(ln y2)  α22  -0.380 -0.093 -0.311 -0.073 
   (ln y1)(ln y2)  α12  0.380 1.560  0.311 1.325 
Inputs-Outputs  (ln x1)(ln y1)  θ11  0.189 0.458  -0.876  -4.187 
   (ln x1)(ln y2)  θ12  -0.189 -0.458 0.876 4.187 
   (ln x2)(ln y1)  θ21  -0.189 -0.458 0.876 4.187 
   (ln x2)(ln y2)  θ22  0.189 0.458 -0.876 -4.187 
Technical change t  γt  -0.009 -0.689  -0.008 -0.404 
   t
2  γtt  0.007 0.254  0.005 0.116 
   (ln x1)t  η1  -0.047 -0.850  0.076 1.764 
   (ln x2)t  η2  0.047 0.850 -0.076 -1.764 
   (ln y1)t  μ1  -0.014 -0.411  0.041 1.070 
   (ln y2)t  μ2  0.014 0.411 -0.041 -1.070 
Environmental 
variables                  
   Intercept  −δ0  -0.393 -1.904  -0.892 -1.257 
   Age 1997  −δ1  -1.106 -3.499  -0.495 -6.932 
   Intercity  −δ2  0.950 3.059  0.432 2.731 
   Network South East  −δ3  2.020 5.252  0.255 1.650 
  
Contract Length 
Remaining 1997  −δ4  -0.537 -2.374  -0.057 -0.887 
   GVA per capita 1997  −δ5  0.080 0.093  -0.356  -1.081 
Model statistics  σ
2   0.127     0.048    
   γ=σu/(σu+σv)    0.997   0.000    
   log likeliihood function    73.636  9.520     
  
LR test on the one-sided  
r (7 restrict)  54.136     50.016    
 
Dependent variable is Ln(DI). 
Inputs: In the Costs Model: Labour Costs (x1) and Other Expenditures (x2); whereas in the Quantities Model the 
inputs are Employees (x1) and Rolling Stock (x2). 
Outputs: Train Miles (y1) and Passenger Miles (y2) are used in both models.   
 
Underlined parameters are calculated by applying homogeneity conditions and constant returns to scale. 